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The performance of Sub-Saharan African economies over the past decade has inspired optimism on the region's prospects for accelerating progress towards its development goals. Before the global financial and economic crisis, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) grew by an average of over five percent per annum, a major turnaround from the 'lost' decades of the 1980s and 1990s. 1 Even during the crisis, the sub-continent grew by 3% in 2009, trailing only East Asia as the second fastest growing region in the world. These achievements notwithstanding, SSA still faces major development challenges. It is now clear that the majority of the countries in the region will not achieve key millennium development goals. 2 A key constraint to SSA's growth and development is the shortage of financing. Indeed SSA faces large and growing financing gaps, hindering public investment and social service delivery. At the same time, the sub-region is a source of large-scale capital flight, which escalated during last decade even as the region experienced growth acceleration. The group of 33 SSA countries covered by this report has lost a total of $814 billion dollars (constant 2010 US$) from 1970 to 2010. This exceeds the amount of official development aid ($659 billion) and foreign direct investment ($306 billion) received by these countries. Oil-rich countries account for 72 percent of the total capital flight from the sub-region ($591 billion). The escalation of capital flight over the last decade coincided with the steady increase in oil prices prior to the global economic crisis.
Assuming that flight capital has earned (or could have earned) the modest interest rate measured by the short-term United States Treasury Bill rate, the corresponding accumulated stock of capital flight from the 33 countries stands at $1.06 trillion in 2010. This far exceeds the external liabilities of this group of countries of $189 billion (in 2010), making the region a "net creditor" to the rest of the world. The stereotypical view that SSA is severely indebted and heavily aid-dependent is not fully consistent with the facts.
This report provides updated estimates of capital flight for 33 SSA countries from 1970 to 2010. It describes the methodology used to estimate capital flight and highlights important methodological differences with other existing studies. The report presents key results on capital flight both in absolute terms and in comparison to other capital flows, especially debt, aid, and foreign direct investment, as well as in relation to the size of the economy (as percentage of GDP and in per capita terms). The report stresses the urgency of efforts to stem capital flight and repatriate stolen assets as a part of the broader goals of scaling up development financing, combating corruption, and improving transparency in the global financial system.
M E A S U R E M E N T O F C A P I T A L F L I G H T A N D D A T A S O U R C E S
The 'residual' measure of capital flight
Capital flight is defined as unrecorded capital flows between a country and the rest of the world. Its measurement starts from the inflows of foreign exchange recorded in the country's Balance of Payments (BoP), in which 'missing money' -the difference between recorded inflows and recorded outflows -is reported as 'net errors and omissions.' Because the BoP data have been found often to under-report external borrowing, data on debt flows are instead taken from the World Bank's Global Development Finance database (www.worldbank.org). The difference between recorded inflows and the recorded uses of foreign exchange provides the baseline 'residual' measure of capital flight (Erbe 1985 , World Bank 1985 . It is computed as follows:
where DEBTADJ  is the change in the stock of external debt outstanding adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations, 3 FDI is net foreign direct investment, CA is the current account deficit, and RES  is net additions to the stock of foreign reserves.
Only a fraction of the 'leakages' revealed by this calculation can be attributed to statistical errors (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007) . Many unrecorded flows result from illicit transactions pursued for a variety of motives, including money laundering, tax evasion and tax avoidance. These have been accompanied, and in some cases exacerbated, by the increasing complexity of financial transactions resulting from globalization, the increasing sophistication of operations of multinational corporations with multiple domiciles across the globe, and the expansion of the 'offshore interface between illicit and licit economies' (Christiansen 2009; also see Shaxson 2011 , Henry 2012 , Baker 2005 .
Trade misinvoicing and unrecorded remittances
Data on external borrowing are not the only numbers that are systematically misreported in official BoP statistics. Trade misinvoicing can substantially distort official measures of exports and imports, and remittance receipts from overseas workers can bypass official recording. Using alternative data sources, we can adjust the simple residual estimate of capital flight to correct for these errors.
Trade mispricing
Misinvoicing of international trade transactions occurs for several reasons. On the export side, operators may underinvoice exports (by understating their quantity, price, or both) so as to conceal their actual earnings and keep the difference in foreign accounts. This can be an important conduit for capital flight, as our results will illustrate. On the import side, businesses may overinvoice their import bills in order to obtain extra foreign currency from banking authorities, again stashing the difference abroad in private accounts or other assets -an analogous mechanism of capital flight. On the other hand, imports may be underinvoiced or not recorded at all so as to circumvent customs duties, phenomena known as 'technical smuggling' and 'pure smuggling,' respectively. Imports must be paid for regardless of whether they are reported in full to the authorities or not. Payments for smuggled imports can be considered another type of illicit financial flow, distinct from capital flight. 4 The amount of trade misinvoicing is estimated by comparing a country's declared imports and exports statistics to those of its trading partners. 
where PXIC is the value of imports from the African country as reported by the industrialized trading partners, XIC is the African country's exports to industrialized countries as reported by the African country, and CIF is the c.i.f/f.o.b factor, representing the costs of freight and insurance. 5 Import discrepancies with the industrialized countries (DMIC) are computed as:
4 While export misinvoicing and import misinvoicing can be estimated separately from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, we cannot use these aggregate data to separate out import overinvoicing and import underinvoicing. Only their net effect can be calculated, which is what matters in estimating total capital flight.
5 South Africa is the only SSA country that publishes imports at both c.i.f. and f.o.b. in the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), making it possible to compute the c.i.f./f.o.b. factor. For other countries, the factor may be derived using the two values of total imports reported in the DOTS labeled: IFS World Total and DOTS World Total. The ratio of the two should be equal or close to 1.10, given that the former series is obtained by applying a 10% factor to the latter according to the IMF's Guide to Direction of Trade Statistics. However, the derived ratios are at times less than 1 and they can fluctuate substantially from one year to another. In our past estimates of capital flight we used the average factor for Africa obtained from IMF's printed DOTS reports, but this information is no longer published. In this report, we use a 1.10 factor for all countries except for South Africa where we use the actual ratio of imports c.i.f to imports f.o.b calculated from DOTS data.
where MIC is the African country's imports from industrialized countries as reported by the African country, and PMIC is the industrialized countries' exports to the African country as reported by the industrialized trading partners.
We scale up the derived value of trade misinvoicing by the inverse of the share of advanced economies in the country's total imports (ICMS) and total exports (ICXS) to obtain a global measure of import and export misinvoicing as follows:
Total trade misinvoicing is the sum of misinvoicing of exports and misinvoicing of imports. A positive sign on export misinvoicing indicates a net outflow (export underinvoicing) -increasing net capital flight -while a negative sign indicates a net inflow (export overinvoicing) -reducing net capital flight. In most cases, we expect export underinvoicing to dominate export overinvoicing. A positive sign on import misinvoicing again indicates a net outflow (overinvoicing of imports) -increasing net capital flight -while a negative sign indicates a net inflow (underinvoicing as a result of import smuggling) -reducing net capital flight. In many cases, smuggling dominates import overinvoicing, resulting in negative import misinvoicing adjustments, and when this is large enough to outweigh net export underinvoicing as well, the overall effect of the misinvoicing adjustment is to reduce estimated capital flight below the simple residual measure. This is because some of the 'missing money' was used to fund the deficit in illicit trade transactions, rather than being counted as an unrecorded capital outflow.
Unrecorded workers' remittances
Workers' remittances are often under-reported in the official BoP statistics of developing countries. This has the same effect as the underreporting of export earnings. We estimate unrecorded remittances by comparing the country's officially recorded remittances as reported in the BoP to survey-based estimates compiled by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) for the year 2006. 7 In comparing the two measures, we consider only the IFAD estimates of remittances flows from industrialized countries as they are likely to be more reliable. In principle, the BoP value should be larger because it includes remittances from the entire world, not only from the industrialized countries. When the IFAD estimate exceeds the BoP value, we take this as evidence of underreporting and calculate the discrepancy. We then extrapolate the discrepancy based on IFAD's data for the year 2006 to estimate discrepancies for earlier and subsequent years, based on the trend in overall African remittance inflows reported in the BoP statistics. The formula is as follows:
where RID it is the remittance inflow discrepancy in country i in year t; ARI i, 2006 and BPRI i, 2006 The total magnitude of capital flight in a given year t for a country i is then obtained by summing up the above components as follows:
Real capital flight and stock of capital flight
To facilitate analysis of capital flight over time, we express our results in constant 2010 dollars, using the US GDP deflator to convert nominal to real values. We also calculate the accumulated stock of capital flight by imputing interest earnings using the US short-term Treasury bill rate. Of course, not all the capital flight from SSA countries was invested at this rate of return. Some was squandered on extravagant consumption, some may have earned lower returns, and some may have earned higher returns than the rather conservative T-bill benchmark. Regardless, our estimated stock of capital flight provides a measure of opportunity costs to the source country; that is, the benefits foregone by virtue of the loss of capital that could have been invested in infrastructure, health, education, or other productive uses.
Data sources

Main sources
The variables used in the in the computation of capital flight are from the IMF's Balance of Payments Statistics (BoP), Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), and International Financial Statistics (IFS); the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), and Global Development Finance (GDF). A detailed list of the variables and data sources is provided in Table A1 in the appendix (page 17).
Missing DOTS and BOP data
The electronic DOTS database contains trade data from 1980 onwards only. The data for the 1970s were obtained from printed editions of the DOTS Yearbook. BoP data are reported sparsely in the early years of the 1970s for most countries in the online and CDROM versions of these databases. Thus, printed versions of the BoP were used to fill in the missing data. Up to 1983, the values in the printed editions of the BoP were reported in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The values were converted into US dollars (USD) using the USD/SDR exchange rate. For some countries, data were also missing in the BoP in some years over the 1980-2010 period. We used IMF's online country staff reports to fill these gaps. The concerned years are shown in Table A2 in the appendix.
Debt data
For some countries the currency composition of long-term debt appears to be incomplete as the sum of the shares of the components does not add up to 100% in some years. This is the case for Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, and Mozambique. In those years, we used the unadjusted change in debt stock in lieu of .
DEBTADJ 
The concerned countries and the relevant years are also shown in Table A2 in the appendix.
For South Africa, the data on debt and the currency composition of long-term debt are available in WDI/GDF only starting from 1994. We obtained debt stock data for the previous years from the South African Research Bank (online database). 8 No adjustment for exchange-rate fluctuation for these years was made due to lack of data on the currency composition of long-term debt.
Key methodological differences with existing studies
There are some notable differences in the methodologies used in the computation of capital flight in the literature. In addition to the underlying imperfections of the data, these differences partly explain the discrepancies in the magnitudes of the estimates of capital flight across studies. There are three important differences between our approach and the approaches used in some of the existing studies. First, our estimates systematically include trade misinvoicing, which can substantially increase or reduce estimated capital flight. The recent report by the Tax Justice Network (Henry 2012) , for example, does not include this important component on grounds of the poor quality of the trade data. In our view, the imperfect data on misinvoicing are more accurate than the alternative assumption that net misinvoicing equals zero. Second, our methodology includes an estimate of unrecorded remittances. Remittances from overseas workers are a large and growing source private capital inflows in African countries, and they often are substantially underestimated in the official Balance of Payments statistics (see AfDB and World Bank 2011). As noted above, unrecorded remittances have the same effect on capital flight estimates as underreported exports earnings.
Third, we allow for the possibility that there can be 'reverse' flows of capital flight -that is, net unrecorded inflows -in any given country in certain years. That is, capital that left the country may return as economic and political circumstances change. We also allow for the possibility that net import misinvoicing (and net trade misinvoicing overall) can result in a downward adjustment of capital flight estimates, as noted above, when import smuggling dominates other sorts of trade misinvoicing. The methodology used by the Washington, DC-based Global Financial Integrity to estimate 'illicit financial flows,' in contrast, sets to zero the values of capital flight and its components (BoP leakages, export and import misinvoicing) when they are negative (see Kar and Cartwright 2010) , on the grounds that these 'reversals' should not be deducted from the measure of illicit flows. Our algorithm, which includes both positive and negative inflows in the computation to obtain a 'net' measure of unrecorded capital flows, is the standard practice in the economics literature. Net capital flight provides a measure of the net financial position of the country vis-à-vis the rest of the world resulting from unrecorded crossborder movement of capital. Thus, a positive value of capital flight indicates that the country is transferring to the rest of the world more than it is receiving.
U P D A T E D E S T I M A T E S O F C A P I T A L F L I G H T , 1 9 7 0 -2 0 1 0
This section summarizes the results of the estimation of capital flight for the 33 SSA countries covered by this report. Detailed country time series are provided in Table A5 in the appendix.
Capital flight on the rise
Capital flight from SSA countries is a chronic problem and it has accelerated over the last decade (Figure 1 ). Between 1970 and 2010 total capital flight from the 33 SSA countries covered in this report amounts to $814.2 billion in constant 2010 dollars. These countries lost $202.4 billion between 2005 and 2010 alone.
Source: Authors' computations. (Table 1) .
Source: Authors' computations By 2010, the stock of capital flight including compound interest earnings reached $1.06 trillion, which slightly exceeds the combined economic size of these countries as measured by GDP ($1.05 trillion in 2010). The stock of capital flight also exceeds the $188.6 billion of external debt owed by these countries, making them as a group a 'net creditor' to the rest of the world. In other words, these countries could go debt free if they could recuperate just 18 percent of the capital they have lost in unrecorded outflows.
The scale of capital flight is large relative to the size of the economies and the population of these countries (Table A3 in the appendix). In several countries, total real capital flight over the period per capita exceeds current per capita income. In Gabon, capital flight per capita ($16,911) is nearly twice its per capita income ($8,767) in 2010. The same holds for Angola, the Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria. On an annual basis, Gabon lost capital at an average of 41 percent of GDP and $597 per capita. The data on capital formation presented in Table A3 suggest that many African countries could achieve a much higher investment rate if they were able to 
Capital losses through trade misinvoicing and unrecorded remittances
Overall for the 33 countries as a group, the residual measure of capital flight amounted to $505.4 billion over the 1970-2010 period. Net trade misinvoicing contributed an additional $204.8 billion to total capital flight, while unrecorded remittances added $104 billion.
These aggregate numbers conceal wide cross-country variations in the relative size of these individual components (see Table A4 in the appendix). The following key combinations of patterns emerge with respect to trade misinvoicing (see Table 2 ):
1. Substantial export underinvoicing and import overinvoicing, both resulting in net outflows (positive sign), as in the cases of Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe.
2. Substantial export underinvoicing (net outflows) coupled with import underinvoicing (net inflows), with the balance resulting in a net outflow, as in the case of Sudan or a net inflow, as in the cases of Ethiopia and Ghana.
Export overinvoicing (net inflows) coupled with import overinvoicing (net outflows)
, as in the case of Zambia.
4. Little net misinvoicing of either imports or exports, as in the case of Angola.
T A B L E 2 : T R A D E M I S I N V O I C I N G A N D U N R E C O R D E D R E M I T T A N C E S ,
1 9 7 0 -2 0 1 0 : Unrecorded remittances also contribute substantially to estimated capital flight in some countries. In Ethiopia, the volume of remittances reported by the World Bank in 2010 was about half the amount reported by the Central Bank ($661 million). Even the latter was considered to be substantially lower than the actual flows
given that large stock of immigrants. The true figure could be as high as one billion dollars. 9 If so, Ethiopian capital flight would be commensurately larger than the estimate reported here.
Capital flight compared to other flows
While Sub-Saharan Africa is typically referred to as a heavily indebted, aid-dependent region, in reality the sub-continent appears to have transferred to the rest of the world more than it has received. Between 1970 and 2010, the 33 countries received a total of $659.5 billion in official development assistance and attracted $306.4 billion in foreign direct investment (Table 3) . 10 Capital flight exceeded ODA and FDI combined in the 1970s and 1980s. The cumulative amount of capital flight over the four decades represents 84.2 percent of ODA and FDI combined. The nine leading oil-exporting countries received a total of $186 billion of ODA (50.8 percent of the total for the sample) and $186 billion of FDI (28.2%), compared to $590.7 billion in total capital flight (72.5%).
It is often reported that SSA countries have benefited from an increase in ODA and FDI over the last decade, which may have supported the observed higher growth before the global crisis. 11 This can be seen in Figure 3 (page 12) for the group of 33 SSA countries covered in this report. But what is also evident is that in these countries capital flight also accelerated in this period. Indeed, capital flight outpaced ODA and FDI since 2000. 
F I G U R E 3 : C A P I T A L F L I G H T , F D I , A N D O D A , 1 0 -Y E A R C U M U L A T I V E F L O W S ( B I L L I O N , C O N S T A N T 2 0 1 0 D O L L A R S )
Source: Capital flight data are from authors' computations; FDI and ODA are from World Development Indicators. Nominal values are deflated using the US GDP deflator (base 2010=100).
As sub-Saharan African countries accumulated large amounts of external debt, debt service often more than matched new borrowing, resulting in negative net transfers on debt (Figure 4 ). In the 1990s, the cumulative net transfers on debt from the 33 countries as a group were negative (-$20 billion, Table 3 ). Net external debt inflows increased since early 2000s partly as a result of the implementation of debt relief mechanisms under the HIPC initiative. The timing of the upswing of these flows coincides with the escalation of capital flight, illustrating the close relationship between external borrowing and capital flight, or 'revolving door,' which we have documented in earlier studies (Ndikumana and Boyce 2003 , 2011a , 2011b .
F I G U R E 4 : N E T T R A N S F E R S O N D E B T F O R T H E 3 3 C O U N T R I E S ( B I L L I O N , C O N S T A N T 2 0 1 0 D O L L A R S )
Source: World Bank's Global Development Finance. 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
C A P I T A L F L I G H T I S A S E R I O U S D E V E L O P M E N T C H A L L E N G E
As Sub-Saharan African countries attempt to mobilize more resources for development, they must pay much more attention to capital flight for several reasons.
First, by draining valuable national resources, capital flight widens the resource gaps faced by these countries, perpetuating their dependence on external aid. Moreover, by deepening the resource gaps, capital flight slows down capital accumulation and long-run growth.
Second, capital flight frustrates African countries' efforts to increase domestic resource mobilization. It erodes the tax base and public expenditure through illicit transfer of private capital abroad, tax evasion and tax avoidance by individuals and companies, and outright embezzlement of government revenue by corrupt officials. These perverse effects force governments to incur further debts, part of which ends up fueling more capital flight (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011a , 2011b , 2010 , 2003 .
Third, by draining government revenues and retarding growth, capital flight undermines the poverty reduction agenda. It is estimated that if the capital that currently leaves Africa illegally was invested on the continent, the continent could meet the Millennium Development Goal of cutting poverty in half, a target it is otherwise likely to miss (AfDB, OECD, UNECA, and UNDP 2012).
Fourth, capital flight is both a symptom and an outcome of governance breakdown in source countries as well as in the international financial system. It is a result of corruption, dysfunctional regulation and weak enforcement of rules.
Fifth, capital flight worsens income inequality and it has important social and equity implications. Insofar as the perpetrators of capital flight, tax evasion and tax avoidance are the economic and the political elites, capital flight makes tax incidence more regressive in that wealthy residents incur relatively smaller tax burdens than would otherwise be the case.
Finally, capital flight has important political economy implications for the distribution of power. The political elites are able to consolidate power by financing their oppressive machinery with illicit wealth. As a result, capital flight strengthens dictatorships and provides the means to perpetuate autocratic regimes, as evidenced by the cases of Mobutu in the former Zaïre and the various military dictatorships in Nigeria, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea Boyce 1998, 2011a) .
Capital flight must move higher on the agenda in the development policy discourse not only in sub-Saharan Africa but also globally. Capital flight is not just an African problem; it is a symptom of a global financial system that is working badly.
CONCLUSION
The evidence presented in this report demonstrates that capital flight is a severe drain on the resources of sub-Saharan African countries, and that it is worsening over time. The sub-continent has been transferring more capital abroad than it has received in public and private lending, ironically making it a 'net lender' to the rest of the world.
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